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483 
SAY ON PAY IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT:  
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS IN  
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis in the United States that began in 2008
1
 spurred 
public outcry over what was perceived to be excessive executive 
compensation at a time when the economy was performing poorly.
2
 
Special interest was paid to the poor performance of firms in the banking 
and financial services industries that were believed to be largely 
responsible for the crisis.
3
 In response, Congress drafted legislation to 
heighten regulation of the financial services industry and increase 
reporting requirements for public corporations. The product of their work, 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(―Dodd-Frank Act‖), was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 
2010.
4
 In addition to heightened regulation of the finance industry,
5
 the 
Dodd-Frank Act included corporate governance provisions requiring all 
public companies to adopt so-called ―say on pay‖ provisions.6 These say 
on pay provisions require public corporations listed on U.S. stock 
exchanges to allow shareholders to cast a nonbinding vote indicating their 
approval or disapproval of the executive compensation plan at least once 
every three years.
7
 
Corporate governance issues within the United States, especially 
regarding executive compensation, have long been subjects of interest for 
 
 
 1. Phil Mattingly & Patrick O‘Connor, Financial Overhaul Is Law, Now Comes Battle Over Its 
Rules, BLOOMBERG (July 21, 2010, 11:17 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-21/obama 
-signs-biggest-overhaul-of-financial-rules-since-the-great-depression.html. 
 2. Ben Protess, In Split Vote, S.E.C. Adopts Rules on Corporate Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, 
at B4 (―Lawmakers are hoping to discourage companies from awarding lucrative packages that 
encourage risky behavior—a chief criticism of firms like Lehman Brothers and American International 
Group that collapsed during the financial crisis.‖). 
 3. Jim Puzzanghera, Senate Passes Sweeping Financial Overhaul Legislation, L.A. TIMES, July 
16, 2010, at B1. 
 4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1376-2223 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the code with the relevant section 
is at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010)). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. § 951. 
 7. Id.  
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scholars, the media, and the public at large.
8
 Advocates for say on pay 
around the world have historically argued that it would help curb 
excessive executive compensation during times of poor company 
performance and increase dialogue between shareholders and the board of 
directors. In particular, it would suggest the appropriate level of executive 
compensation from a shareholder‘s perspective given company 
performance.
9
 Say on pay provisions are growing in popularity 
internationally and types of say on pay provisions similar to the Dodd-
Frank Act have been instituted in a number of countries around the 
globe.
10
 In the United Kingdom, similar say on pay provisions have been 
in place since 2002.
11
  
This Note analyzes the say on pay provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act 
and offers opinions as to whether it will be effective. Part II lays out the 
history of say on pay in the United Kingdom, the specific terms of the 
regulations, and the effect of the U.K. regulatory scheme following its 
enactment. Part III discusses the say on pay regulations enacted in the 
United States under the Dodd-Frank Act, compares the terms of the United 
State‘s regulations to the U.K. regulations, and addresses the projected 
effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States. Part IV 
concludes that the Dodd-Frank Act say on pay regulations appear to meet 
the goal of allowing for increased accountability of executive 
 
 
 8. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Executive Compensation, 17.4 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2004) (critiquing corporate 
current corporate governance practices and subsequent executive compensation while arguing for more 
independence by boards of directors as a solution to executive compensation problem); John Core, 
Wayne Guay & David F. Larcker, The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation 1 (May 23, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=838347 (compiling research 
data on the high prevalence of major media sources coverage of executive compensation from 1994 to 
2002, but finding negative coverage to have little influence on executive compensation). 
 9. See Stephen M. Davis, Does „Say On Pay‟ Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation 
Accountable (The Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance, Policy Briefing No. 1 
(2007), http://millstein.som.yale.edu/sites/millstein.som.yale.edu/files/Policy%20Briefing%20No%20 
1%20‘Say%20on%20Pay‘.pdf (detailing a history of the United Kingdom say on pay provisions and 
describing the resulting benefits). 
 10. In 2004, Australia passed Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 which required that all companies allow their shareholders to vote on 
the remunerations report at the Annual General Meeting. Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
(Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) sch 5 (Austl.); Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay 
and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law and CEO Compensation, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 235 
(2008). Other countries also have legislation concerning say on pay. See id. at 235–36 (discussing the 
similar legislation requiring nonbinding or advisory votes in United Kingdom and Norway and a 
binding vote in the Netherlands). 
 11. See Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986 (U.K.); see also 
Davis, supra note 9, at 9 (―When calls on companies voluntarily to introduce such measures failed to 
take hold, the government introduced legislation in parliament in August 2002. ‗Say on pay‘ came into 
effect in 2003.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/8
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compensation via shareholder engagement, though only time will tell if the 
application of the regulations fulfills its promise.  
II. SAY ON PAY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom provides a helpful comparison to the U.S. 
regulatory scheme for say on pay. This Part explores the history, terms, 
and results of the U.K. say on pay regulations. 
A. History 
In the United Kingdom in the 1990s, national attention focused on 
stories of newly privatized utility companies granting executives 
significantly increased salaries for performing the same job duties as 
before the privatization.
12
 The press also focused on executives‘ receipt of 
increased salaries in other industries.
13
 What made the increased salaries 
especially newsworthy was that they happened at a time when significant 
layoffs were also occurring.
14
  
In response to the public outcry, the United Kingdom passed the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (―Combined Code‖) in 1998.15 
The Combined Code required public companies
16
 to comply with the 
Combined Code or explain noncompliance with its requirements. The 
Combined Code also required companies to consider and record their 
decision to seek shareholder approval of the company's remuneration 
policies on an annual basis.
17
  
The Combined Code, however, had limited effect,
18
 and changes were 
necessary. Because of salary escalation, economic troubles, and golden 
parachute payments to dismissed CEOs during the late 1990s and early 
2000s, in 2002 the United Kingdom drafted an amendment to the U.K. 
Companies Act, the Directors Remuneration Report Regulations (―DRR 
 
 
 12. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the 
Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 341 (2009). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. at 342. 
 16. Specifically, the Combined Code required compliance by companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Only a very small number of companies actually brought compensation policy questions to 
shareholders for a vote. Id. Thus, though companies were complying with the Combined Code 
requirements, shareholders were not often given the opportunity to voice their disapproval over 
compensation policies to effect meaningful compensation changes. See id. 
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Regulations‖).19 The DRR Regulations required an increased level of 
detail in company disclosure to shareholders as well as a new advisory 
vote by the shareholders on the Directors‘ Remuneration Report 
(―DRR‖).20 
B. Regulatory Requirements 
The DRR has to include specific disclosure of the types of 
compensation paid to senior executives in addition to a statement of the 
company‘s overall compensation policy.21 The statement must include an 
analysis of a company‘s performance compared to its peers and must be 
signed by remuneration committee members.
22
 The remuneration 
committee is a committee made up of members of the board of directors 
for the company, and its responsibility is to oversee remuneration issues at 
the firm, including the DRR.
23
 The quantitative compensation elements of 
the DRR are required to be independently audited.
24
  
There is a mandatory vote on the DRR by shareholders for every public 
company.
25
 However, the results of the vote are nonbinding on the actions 
of the company, meaning the company technically suffers no 
repercussions or adverse effects if the shareholders vote a disapproval of 
the DRR.
26
 Nonetheless, if a board fails to satisfy the requirements 
mandated under the DRR, its directors are guilty of an offense punishable 
by a fine.
27
  
 
 
 19. See Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986 (U.K.); see also 
Jonathan Baird & Peter Stowaser, Executive Compensation and Disclosure Requirements: The 
German, UK, and US Approaches, GLOBAL COUNS., Oct. 2002, at 32, available at http://cross 
border.practicallaw.com/4-101-7960 (summarizing recent legislative changes to corporate governance, 
specifically addressing the new say on pay provisions in the United Kingdom). 
 20. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 341–42. 
 21. Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986 § 234(B)(2)-(3) 
(U.K.). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. § 234(B)(2) 
 24. Id. § 234(B)(6)-(13). These quantitative elements subject to audit include emoluments, share 
options, long-term incentive plans, pensions, compensation, and excess retirement benefits of each 
director. Id. 
 25. Id. § 241(A)(1), (6). 
 26. Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986 § 241(A)(1), (6) 
(U.K.). 
 27. Id. §§ 234(B)(3), (6); 234(c)(4),(6); 241(A)(9)-(10). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/8
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C. Say on Pay Results 
Proponents of these say on pay measures in the United Kingdom have 
claimed the disclosure requirements under the DRR to be a success.
28
 The 
first successful vote of ―no‖ under DRR occurred at GlaxoSmithKline in 
the first year of the new regulation requirements.
29
 In that case, the Chief 
Executive Officer‘s severance package included a very large golden 
parachute payment that angered the shareholders and led them to vote 
―no.‖30 However, outright rejections of DRRs occurred very rarely 
following the enactment of the legislation in 2003
31
 until 2009.
32
 In 2009, 
following the economic downturn of 2008, five companies received 
rejections of DRRs and a number of others were close to rejection.
33
 In 
2010, three companies had their DRRs rejected by shareholders.
34
 
Interestingly, observers partially attribute this low number of rejections 
of DRRs to the existence of the say on pay legislation itself.
35
 The 
 
 
 28. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 9. 
 29. See Heather Timmons, Glaxo Shareholders Revolt Against Pay Plan for Chief, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 20, 2003, at W1. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Davis, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that in the first four years following the enactment of 
say on pay legislation in the United Kingdom, only eight companies, all of which were small in size, 
with the exception of GlaxoSmithKline, had say on pay resolutions defeated by shareholder votes on 
the directors report on remuneration). 
 32. See Directors‟ Remuneration: An Introduction to the Issues, OUT-LAW.COM (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://www.out-law.com/page-11141 (―Five companies had their directors‘ remuneration reports 
‗thrown out‘ and several others, BP among them, came close to losing the vote.‖). 
 33. Id. In 2009, the Royal Bank of Scotland was rejected when over 90% of shareholders voted 
in opposition to the DRR. See Deborah Gilshan, Say on Pay: Six Years On—Lessons from the UK 
Experience, RAILPEN INV. & PIRC LTD. 15 (2009), http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/Say%20on% 
20Pay%20-%20Six%20Years%20On%2009-24-09.pdf. Royal Dutch Shell had its DRR rejected by 
almost 60% of its shareholders. Id. Bellway PLC and Provident Financial PLC also had their DRRs 
rejected by shareholders. Id. 
 The significant size of the rejection vote at the Royal Bank of Scotland was due to outrage over a 
sizeable pension award made to the former chief executive of the Royal Bank of Scotland coming on 
the heels of taxpayer bailouts given to the Bank in 2009. See Directors‟ Remuneration: An 
Introduction to the Issues, supra note 32. 
 Royal Dutch Shell had its DRR rejected because of a decision by the remuneration committee to 
provide a significant payout under a long-term incentive plan to its executives despite the fact that the 
company did not meet the minimum performance requirements under the plan to receive a payout. Id. 
The shareholders did not approve of the committee using its discretion to award payouts for 
underperformance. Id. 
 Bellway PLC had its DRR rejected by shareholders because the company changed the 
performance measurements used to determine payouts under a compensation plan once the company 
realized the executives would fail to meet the performance targets required under the initial 
performance measurements. Id. 
 34. Looking Back on 2010, PIRC, http://www.pirc.co.uk/news/looking-back-on-2010 (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2011) (noting that in 2010 three companies received a rejection of their DRR by shareholders). 
 35. In addition to the benefit of providing a vote to shareholders, the DRR has provided 
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existence of the legislation has increased dialogue between corporate 
boards and management and large shareholders, as corporations do not 
wish to have the increased public scrutiny of a successful ―no‖ vote.36 
Because of companies‘ aversion to receiving ―no‖ votes, they are more 
receptive to discussing compensation plans with shareholders before and 
after changes are made.
37
  
As an additional effect, the influence of institutional investor 
associations
38
 has greatly increased. Institutional investor associations 
have introduced guidelines which provide a recommendation to 
shareholders for how they should vote based on a company‘s adherence to 
the guidelines.
39
 The guidelines have become widely used.
40
 In essence, 
shareholders are taking their cues on whether to vote ―yes‖ or ―no‖ 
directly from the institutional investor association‘s comments on how 
well the company is conforming to the guidelines created by the 
institutional investor association.
41
  
 
 
companies an opportunity to more fully explain their compensation philosophy and generate goodwill 
from shareholders for having remuneration programs that do not provide egregious payments to 
executives. See Gilshan, supra note 33, at 14 (―It is worth noting that most firms do not have egregious 
pay practices and have a good story to tell in terms of their remuneration practices. For these 
companies the vote has become an opportunity to gain shareholder endorsement of their pay 
practices.‖).  
 36. See Davis, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that after the defeat of GlaxoSmithKline‘s DRR and 
the subsequent bad publicity that GlaxoSmithKline‘s failure generated, large institutional investors and 
investor advisory groups received a substantive increase in requests to discuss executive compensation 
pay packages from managers and directors of corporations in order to help ensure that the executive 
compensation pay package would receive an approval vote). 
 37. Id. However, while evidence exists that companies have increased dialogue with shareholders 
to prevent rejections of DRRs, companies have also used the process of consultation with shareholders 
to their advantage. See Gilshan, supra note 33, at 14. In such instances, a company will offer an initial 
proposal it expects the shareholders to reject, but the ultimate goal is to gain approval for a subsequent 
proposal the company actually preferred to the original. Id. 
 Additionally, shareholder dialogue has caused some companies to be disabused of the notion that 
simply consulting with shareholders will provide automatic approval of whatever compensation plan is 
proposed. Id. 
 38. An institutional investor, as defined by Black‘s Law Dictionary, is: ―[O]ne who trades large 
volumes of securities, usu[ally] by investing other people‘s money into large managed funds. 
Institutional investors are often pension funds, investment companies, trust managers, or insurance 
companies.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 904 (9th ed. 2009). 
 39. The National Association of Pension Funds (―NAPF‖) and the Association of British Insurers 
(―ABI‖) represent the leading associations of institutional investors in the United Kingdom and, as 
large shareholders, have the ability to exert the most influence over pay regulations in the United 
Kingdom because they have large numbers of votes. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 343–44. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (explaining that the ABI and NAPF have exerted their influence by creating a set of 
compensation guidelines for executive compensation built upon the ―best practices‖ for executive 
compensation included in the Combined Code that they often use as a basis for determining whether to 
recommend approval of a company‘s DRR).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/8
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Moreover, the prevalence of long-term guaranteed contracts for 
executives has decreased, likely because companies do not want to appear 
to ―pay for failure.‖ In such cases, although company performance has 
been poor, an executive receives large amounts of compensation because 
the employment contract guaranteed the amount of compensation for 
multiple years regardless of company performance.
42
 Companies have also 
decreased the amount of stock options awarded to executives and 
increased the amount of long-term incentive plan awards.
43
 
Additionally, the U.K. government views the say on pay provisions as 
providing a competitive advantage to their capital markets for two 
reasons.
44
 First, from a public relations standpoint, such measures serve as 
a message that the government wants to deter excessive executive 
compensation.
45
 Second, international investors are attracted to their 
capital markets because of the increased influence over a company that say 
on pay provides to investors.
46
 
While there has been substantial anecdotal information and opinion 
surveys gathered regarding the success of the legislation,
47
 the empirical 
evidence tells a somewhat different story. The empirical studies offer 
evidence that the institution of say on pay has decreased ―pay for failure‖ 
instances,
48
 but the actual rate of pay for executives has continued to 
 
 
 42. Id. at 344 (noting that few companies in the United Kingdom presently offer contracts to 
senior managers for more than one year nor do they tend to offer an acceleration of options for senior 
managers upon a change in control, the latter representing the U.K. version of the U.S. golden 
parachute). 
 43. In 2001, greater than 60% of shares awarded were in the form of stock options and less than 
30% of shares were long-term incentive plan shares, but by 2008, less than 20% of shares awarded 
were in the form of stock options and greater than 70% of shares were long-term incentive plan shares. 
See Gilshan, supra note 33, at 22. 
 One reason for this change in pay mix from stock options to long-term share awards is that 
starting in 2003, because of decreased stock prices in 2002, most executives options were underwater 
and, thus, had no value. Id.  
 Another reason for the change in pay mix is that longterm incentive plans offered a more 
innovative method of compensation better tied to company performance and thus became normal 
market practice. Id. 
 44. See Davis, supra note 9, at 14. 
 45. U.K. government officials saw the say on pay provision as a public relations preventive 
measure to deter the types of corporate scandals over excessive pay that had made headlines prior to 
enacting the legislation. See id.  
 46. The United Kingdom believed investors would be interested in putting capital into the market 
where they, as shareholders, would have more influence due to the ability to exercise control over the 
company by voting on the executive compensation arrangement, especially in comparison to the 
capital markets in the United States that, at the time, did not allow for such voting by shareholders on 
executive compensation. See id. 
 47. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 9. 
 48. See Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence from 
the U.K. (Oct. 15, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420394. The study indicates that companies that 
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increase steadily, even after the implementation of say on pay measures by 
the United Kingdom.
49
  
Ultimately, while there have been some unexpected developments as a 
result of say on pay, such as increased institutional investor influence and 
a relatively low number of shareholder rejections, the effects of the 
legislation have been largely positive.
 
 
III. SAY ON PAY IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act has created a requirement for 
a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation for public 
corporations similar to the DRR in the United Kingdom.
50
 Interest in say 
on pay in the United States existed before the passage of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, with a number of companies voluntarily adopting say on pay 
provisions prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank Act.
51
 Additionally, say on 
pay provisions already existed for firms receiving federal aid under the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (―TARP‖) implemented by the 
government in the wake of the financial crisis.
52
 However, the Dodd-Frank 
Act was the first piece of legislation to require regular nonbinding say on 
pay votes for all publicly traded companies listed on U.S. stock 
exchanges.
53
  
 
 
have been performing poorly or that have had pay practices that do not adhere to the guidelines 
recommended by institutional investor advisory associations are the ones most likely to receive higher 
percentages of ―no‖ votes and, therefore, change compensation practices to better adhere to the 
guidelines provided by the institutional investor advisory associations. Id. See also Gilshan, supra note 
33, at 25 (―The reduction in service contract lengths for executive directors has significantly reduced 
the risk of so-called ‗rewards for failure.‘‖). 
 49. See Gilshan, supra note 33, at 22 (noting that while many benefits have arisen from the 
implementation of say on pay regulations, overall pay levels for executives continued to increase from 
2003 through 2008 in the United Kingdom); Ferri & Maber, supra note 48. 
 50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010). 
 51. See e.g. Gretchen Morgenson, Say-on-Pay Gets Support at Verizon, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
2007, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/technology/19verizon.html?_r=1&scp 
=2&sq=&st=nyt (noting the approval of an adoption of a nonbinding say on pay shareholder vote at 
Verizon); Joseph E. Bachelder III, The “Restoring American Financial Stability Act” and Executive 
Pay, N.Y. L.J., June 28, 2010, at 3 (―[A]pproximately 80 companies had adopted some form of Say on 
Pay as of June 4, 2010 . . . .‖). 
 52. See Bachelder, supra note 51 (noting that TARP required approximately 650 companies to 
provide say on pay for their shareholders as a condition of receiving federal aid under TARP). 
 53. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010). 
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A. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 
The Dodd-Frank Act contains a number of provisions concerning the 
mechanics for say on pay voting in the United States.
54
 Regarding the 
timing of when the voting has to occur, the Dodd Frank Act states:  
Not less frequently than once every 3 years, a proxy or consent or 
authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for 
which the proxy solicitation rules of the Commission require 
compensation disclosure shall include a separate resolution subject 
to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives 
. . . .
55
  
Further, to determine the frequency of this vote by shareholders to approve 
the executive compensation plan, the Dodd-Frank Act states:  
Not less frequently than once every 6 years, a proxy or consent or 
authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for 
which the proxy solicitation rules of the Commission require 
compensation disclosure shall include a separate resolution subject 
to shareholder vote to determine whether votes on the resolutions 
required under paragraph (1) will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years.
56
  
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act requires disclosures in proxy 
materials for ―golden parachute‖57 agreements used to compensate 
executives. These disclosures are required when shareholders vote on a 
proposed acquisition, merger, consolidation or total sale of the company‘s 
assets.
58
 The Act requires disclosure of golden parachutes for any named 
executive officer of the company, describing the aggregate total of 
parachute payments that may be paid to such officer.
59
 The company must 
also provide for a separate vote to approve any parachute payments, unless 
the related golden parachute agreements were subject to an earlier vote.
60
  
 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. A golden parachute is ―named executive officer compensation relating to a change in control 
transaction, such as an acquisition, merger, consolidation or sale of all or substantially all of a 
company's assets.‖ See Katayn I. Jaffari & John H. Chung, The Impact of Dodd-Frank: Will Executive 
Compensation Change as a Result of “Say on Pay” and “Proxy Access”?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 
(Philadelphia, P.A.), Sept. 14, 2010. 
 58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that votes on executive compensation 
and golden parachute agreements will be nonbinding.
61
 Specifically, the 
votes may not be construed to overrule a decision by the company or 
board of directors, to create or change the fiduciary duties of the company 
or board of directors, or to limit shareholders‘ ability to make executive 
compensation proposals to be included in proxy materials.
62
 
Interestingly, the Dodd-Frank Act say on pay provisions allow for an 
exemption from the say on pay requirements for small issuers who would 
be unduly burdened by the provisions, within the discretion of the 
Securities Exchange Commission (―SEC‖) to make such exemption in the 
rules.
63
 However, under the finalized rules adopted by the SEC on January 
25, 2011, the only difference in reporting requirements for small issuers 
regarding shareholder voting on executive compensation is a two-year 
delay in compliance.
64
 
B. Comparison of the U.K. DRR Regulations and the Dodd-Frank Act 
Requirements for Say on Pay 
The most basic similarity between Dodd-Frank and the U.K. DRR 
Regulations is the non-binding nature of the vote. Thus, shareholders are 
 
 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010). 
 62. Id. 
 63. ―The SEC may, by rule or order, exempt an issuer or class of issuers from the requirements 
regarding executive compensation and golden parachutes. In determining whether to make an 
exemption under this subsection, the SEC can take into account, among other considerations, whether 
the requirements disproportionately burden small issuers.‖ Id. 
 64. The SEC has indicated that all public companies subject to the federal proxy rules would be 
required to give shareholders a nonbinding say on pay vote and a nonbinding vote on the frequency of 
the say on pay votes. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-
Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act, Press Release 2011–
25 (Jan. 25, 2011),http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm [hereinafter SEC Press Release]; 
see also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Shareholder Approval of Executive 
Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9178 (Jan. 25, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/ rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf.  
 In regard to smaller companies, the SEC defines a smaller company as one that has a public float 
of less than $75 million. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2009); SEC Press Release. The final version of the 
SEC‘s rules requires smaller companies to have a nonbinding say on pay vote and a nonbinding vote 
on the frequency of the say on pay vote; however, it does not require smaller companies to comply 
with these requirements for two full years. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Shareholder 
Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Exchange Act Release 
No. 33-9178 (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf. The SEC‘s 
stated purpose for this delay is to allow smaller companies time to observe how larger companies 
conduct the votes. Id. 
 In addition to the requirements stated under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC‘s finalized rules require 
that companies disclose both the shareholder vote on the frequency of the shareholder vote on 
executive compensation and whether the frequency vote is nonbinding. Id. 
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simply able to voice their approval or disapproval of the executive 
compensation plan. Shareholders votes do not alter the actual payments 
made to executives.
65
  
The United Kingdom has a much more consistent application of when 
voting will occur. In the United Kingdom the voting is held annually,
66
 
whereas in the United States the voting can be annual, biennial, or 
triennial.
67
 Furthermore, if a shareholder in the United States wishes to 
change the frequency of the voting for approval or rejection of the 
executive compensation plan, the vote to determine the timing of the say 
on pay voting only has to be held at least once every six years.
68
  
Unlike in the United Kingdom, the United States provides a 
government administrative agency, the SEC, with the discretion to exempt 
a corporation that would otherwise be required to conform to the Dodd-
Frank Act say on pay requirements.
69
 However, the criteria the SEC may 
use to determine which companies qualify for exemption from the Dodd-
Frank say on pay voting requirements is not clearly explained in the text of 
the Act itself.
70
 The SEC‘s final rules regarding the say on pay voting 
requirements provide that no companies, even smaller companies, will be 
exempt from the voting requirement, but that does not negate the language 
in the Dodd-Frank Act giving the SEC discretion to do so in the future.
71
  
Additionally, the United Kingdom specifies a punishment for 
noncompliance with the DRR Regulations—directors who fail to comply 
with the statute will be guilty of a crime and liable for a fine.
72
 The United 
States does not specify the potential punishments for non-compliance with 
the say on pay requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act.
73
 
Also of note is the difference of types of investors in the United 
Kingdom from those in the United States. In the United Kingdom, the 
predominant type of shareholder is a single type of institutional 
shareholder.
74
 In the United States, in addition to a sizeable amount of 
 
 
 65. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010); Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 
2002/1986, § 241A(8) (U.K.).  
 66. See Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986, § 241A(6) 
(U.K.).  
 67. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2010).  
 68. Id 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010); Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 
2002/1986 (U.K.).  
 70. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010). 
 71. Id.; see also Exchange Act Release No. 33-9178, supra note 64. 
 72. See Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986, § 241A(9)-(10) 
(U.K.). 
 73. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010). 
 74. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 349–51 (comparing the profile of the capital markets in the 
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institutional investors,
75
 retail investors
76
 account for a considerable 
amount of shareholders in the market.
77
 Because of the diversity in types 
of shareholders in the U.S. market coupled with regulations discouraging 
institutional investors to coordinate their resources,
78
 it is not as likely that 
one type of shareholder will wield as much power in the United States as 
the institutional shareholders do in the United Kingdom.
79
 
C. Reaction to the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States 
The initial reactions to the say on pay provisions in the Dodd-Frank 
Act have been generally positive.
80
 Some commentators believe say on 
pay will provide shareholders a way to voice their displeasure and 
effectuate change.
81
 Other commentators think that say on pay provisions 
will have little to no effect.
82
  
However, Dodd-Frank‘s say on pay provision is not without its critics. 
A number of commentators have argued that the regulations are not strict 
enough to create meaningful change.
83
 Others even argue the regulations 
 
 
United Kingdom and the United States and describing the predominant type of shareholder for each 
country). 
 75. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 38. 
 76. Retail investors are individuals who use their own capital to invest for themselves, as 
opposed to institutional investors, which invest capital provided to them by others.  
 77. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 349–51. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Most commentary has voiced general approval for the implementation of say on pay as a way 
to increase governance of executive compensation by shareholders. See, e.g., David Nicklaus, New 
Law Has Effect on Executive Pay: Shareholders Now Have a Voice in the Process, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 7, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.stltoday.com/business/columns/david-nicklaus/ 
article_2ef7ab6c-dc54-5bc4-9512-2d8b61e8d36e.html (―[Say on pay votes]give shareholders a 
powerful new way to express their discontent with top brass.‖); Patrick May, Apple Execs Richly 
Rewarded for Banner Year, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 8, 2011 (―The practice of allowing 
shareholders to voice their opinion on compensation packagesh—known as ‗say on pay‘—has been 
gaining popularity, thanks in part to rising disgust with the nosebleed salaries and bonuses being paid 
to corporate hotshots.‖). 
 81. Id. 
 82. One expert believes that the Dodd-Frank say on pay regulations will have ―no effect 
whatsoever.‖ Say on Pay: Will U.S. Shareholders Give Executives the Thumbs Up on Compensation?, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Dec. 8, 2010), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid= 
2649.  
 83. Some have argued that because the result of the say on pay vote is nonbinding, the legislation 
does not provide enough substance to create the regulations needed to address the growing problem of 
increasing executive compensation in the face of poor company performance. See, e.g., William D. 
Cohan, Op.-Ed., Make Wall Street Risk It All, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010), http://opinionator.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/make-wall-street-risk-it-all (―And how would Dodd-Frank change this 
dynamic? It would give shareholders a nonbinding ‗say on pay‘ regarding the compensation of 
executives of public corporations. And even if a majority of shareholders expressed their displeasure, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/8
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leave too much discretion in the hands of federal regulators
84
 who may not 
adequately enforce strong regulations in a manner consistent with the 
purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act.
85
 
As an additional criticism, some experts have argued that an 
unintended consequence of the Dodd-Frank say on pay provision could be 
an increase in focus by the board of directors on avoiding the potential 
liability associated with a negative vote for the executive compensation 
package.
86
 This concern could cause boards to move away from their 
intended function of determining how best to appropriately compensate 
the executives into a more conservative, potentially even harmful approach 
to executive compensation.
87
 
Other experts have expressed a belief that a ―no‖ vote by shareholders 
is a powerful tool.
88
 As such, shareholders should consider alternatives to 
a simple ―no‖ vote to provide more clarity in communicating with the 
 
 
the companies would be free to ignore them. Yawn.‖); Editorial, Taking Aim at Executive Pay, CONN. 
L. TRIB. (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/printarticle.aspx?ID=38917 [hereinafter 
Editorial] (―Dodd-Frank largely lacks teeth . . . .‖). 
 84. The SEC is given discretion to exempt companies from the Dodd-Frank Act say on pay 
reporting requirements. See infra Part III.C. 
 85. Some believe the amount of discretion given to the SEC to create rules and enforce them will 
result in a weaker set of regulations than intended. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 83 (―And, as with 
other compensation related rules, standing alone, it lacks the depth to meaningfully influence the 
behavior of boards in providing more justifiable compensation to its executives. That so much has 
been left to the rule-making authority of the SEC and ‗appropriate federal regulators‘ does not 
engender much optimism.‖).  
 The lack of action taken by the SEC in regard to Sarbanes-Oxley is offered as an example of 
another instance in which the SEC was given discretion to regulate executive compensation and did 
not fully capitalize on the opportunity. Id. (―Sarbanes Oxley . . . contained provisions to claw-back 
executive compensation, when the misconduct of employees results in the material restatement of a 
company‘s financial statements. Yet, the SEC has failed to promulgate rules to provide corporate 
america [sic] with a clear set of parameters on the application of the law and has failed to aggressively 
pursue bad acts under this tool.‖). Id. 
 86. Mike Verespej, Experts Weigh in on Financial Reform Bill, PLASTICSNEWS, Sept. 6, 2010, at 
7 (Sept. 9, 2010), http://plasticsnews.com/headlines2.html?id=10090600701&q=Experts+weigh+in+ 
on+financial+reform+bill. Some experts have stated that boards of directors will change their focus 
from responsibly overseeing management to simply avoiding a ―no‖ vote. Id. One expert has 
remarked: ―You will effectively emasculate the board and reduce compensation committees to being a 
paper tiger. That doesn‘t get you anywhere toward improving compensation policies and plans. 
Ultimately, pay will just creep up.‖ Id. 
 87. Id. (―There is the danger that companies and boards will be so busy adopting a compliance 
mentality for the SEC that they will forget that their true audience is investor.‖). 
 88. Id. ( ―[Dodd-Frank] is going to let shareholders and the market put a brake on a lot of the 
decisions that boards have made in the past to jack up pay. I think that is a great direction to go in. You 
don‘t need the government to come into the boardroom and take control.‖); see also Paul Hodgson, 
Greg Ruel & Michelle Lamb, Wall Street Pay: Size, Structure and Significance for Shareowners, 2010 
COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 20, available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CII%20 
White%20Paper%20-%20Wall%20Street%20Pay%20FINAL%20Nov%202010.pdf (―[A] high say-on-
pay ‗against‘ vote is a blunt instrument.‖). 
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company, such as a letter directed to the board of directors explaining the 
vote.
89
 Additionally, shareholders could request an in-person meeting to 
discuss voting behavior.
90
 Shareholders could also vote against the 
reelection of compensation committee members.
91
 Alternatively, the 
shareholder might try to file a shareholder resolution
92
 to address the pay 
practices of which the shareholder does not approve.
93
  
In terms of reactions by companies affected by Dodd-Frank, recently 
collected data suggests that companies will vary in their frequency of say 
on pay voting. A survey taken in December of 2010 projected that most 
companies would have an annual say on pay vote.
94
 Interestingly, the two 
most common factors for deciding the frequency of voting were 
accountability to shareholders and a desire to minimize administrative 
burdens.
95
 Additionally, many companies indicated they were going to 
make changes to their pay-setting processes and pay programs as a result 
of say on pay requirements.
96
  
Data collected following the actual release of proxy materials and 
subsequent shareholder voting in 2011 supports these projections.
97
 Of the 
companies in the Russell 3000 reporting voting results as of June 30, 
2011, the shareholders at a majority of companies supported an annual 
vote.
98
 The next most popular frequency for voting was on a triennial 
 
 
 89. Id. at 20–21. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. A shareholder resolution, as defined by Black‘s Law Dictionary, is: ―A resolution by 
shareholders, usu[ually] to ratify the actions of the board of directors.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 
1426 (9th ed. 2009). However, the shareholder resolution can be a proposal put forward by the 
shareholder rather than the board of directors.  
 93. See Hodgson, supra note 88, at 21. 
 94. U.S. Companies Divided on Say-on-Pay Frequency, Towers Watson Poll Finds, TOWERS 
WATSON (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.towerswatson.com/united-states/press/3501 [hereinafter TOWERS 
WATSON]. Towers Watson conducted an online poll in mid-December of 135 public companies 
regarding their planned timeframe for say on pay votes: 51% indicated they expect to conduct annual 
say on pay votes, 39% indicated they expect to conduct triennial say on pay votes, and 10% indicated 
they expect to conduct biennial say on pay votes. Id. 
 95. Id. Roughly forty percent of respondents said accountability to shareholders and a desire to 
minimize administrative burdens were the factors with the greatest influence on their vote-frequency 
recommendation. Id. Slightly less than forty percent said ―shareholder preferences, proxy advisor 
policies and providing shareholders with an avenue to express concern about executive pay without 
casting negative votes on other matters [were] key factors.‖ Id. 
 96. Id. ―The survey also found that nearly half (48%) of surveyed companies are making some 
adjustments to their executive pay-setting process in preparing for the upcoming proxy season.‖ Id. 
 97. Ted Allen et al., Preliminary 2011 Postseason Report, 2011 POSTSEASON REPORT 4 (Aug. 8, 
2011), http://www.issgovernance.com/docs/2011USSeasonPreview. 
 98. Id. The majority of shareholders at 1792 companies in the Russell 3000 index voted in favor 
of annual votes. Id. at 4. The Russell 3000 index represents an index of the 3000 largest publicly 
traded U.S. companies based on market share. 
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basis, and only a small number of companies had a majority of 
shareholders voting for biennial voting.
99
 
IV. FUTURE ISSUES AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
The Dodd-Frank Act creates a new regulatory environment for 
executive compensation. Consequently, there are a number of potentially 
positive and negative effects that may result from its passage. 
A. Problems 
Requiring a say on pay vote at least once every three years
100
 may 
result in an increased focus on the short-term performance of company 
management to ensure that their performance warrants approval during the 
vote.
101
 The short-term focus could incentivize excessive risk in the long 
term.
102
 Prioritization of the short-term performance is blamed, in part, for 
the financial crisis in the United States that led to the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.
103
 
Another potential problem with the say on pay proposal is the sheer 
amount of resources it requires that might be better spent elsewhere. 
Broadly speaking, the role of management is to lead the company. 
Conceivably, the resources used to address the possibility or correct the 
occurrence of shareholder‘s rejecting an executive compensation plan 
could be better utilized in the core function of each party‘s respective 
role.
104
 Thus, say on pay voting requirements could actually hinder 
 
 
 99. Id. The majority of shareholders at 412 companies voted in favor of triennial votes; the 
majority of shareholders at 16 companies voted in favor of biennial votes. Id. 
 Interestingly, shareholders did not always follow management‘s recommendation on voting 
frequency, especially when management recommended a triennial vote. Id. The management at 
roughly 54% of companies recommended annual voting, 41% recommended triennial voting, 3% 
recommended biennial voting, and 3% gave no recommendation. Id. Shareholders did not vote in favor 
of management‘s recommendation for triennial voting at 564 of 978 companies, and shareholders did 
not follow management‘s recommendation for biennial voting at 43 out of 59 companies. Id. 
 100. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2010). 
 101. See Say on Pay: Will U.S. Shareholders Give Executives the Thumbs Up on Compensation?, 
supra note 82 (―If you want laser-like focus on management pay incentives, you may take the 
managers‘ attention away from important long-term objectives.‖). 
 102. One study suggests that the reason that similar types of incentive structures, in which long-
term repercussions where devalued as compared to short-term success, played a major role in the 
actions of executives on Wall Street leading up to the financial crisis. See HODGSON, supra note 88, at 
2 (―In sum, the lack of long-term performance measurement on Wall Street and high absolute levels of 
compensation likely helped to fuel excessive risk-taking. Large amounts of compensation were 
delivered without restrictions and based on short-term performance.‖). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Say on Pay: Will U.S. Shareholders Give Executives the Thumbs Up on Compensation?, 
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responsible use of corporate resources in times of poor performance. 
Resources that should be dedicated to the company might instead be 
diverted to ensuring the approval of the executive compensation plan.
105
 
The Dodd-Frank Act only gives the SEC the discretion to exempt 
companies when the regulation presents an unfair burden on small 
issuers.
106
 Currently, the finalized version of the SEC regulations would 
apply say on pay requirements to all corporations, regardless of size.
107
 
While the SEC‘s current regulations are ostensibly clear in their 
applicability and not administratively burdensome,
108
 changes could be 
made to the current regulations that would create confusion and 
substantially increase the administrative burden on disclosing companies. 
Moreover, it is unclear how much effort the SEC will put into enforcing 
the new regulations.
109
 
Like in the United Kingdom,
110
 institutional investor advisory groups in 
the United States will now have a more direct influence over the 
executives within the company.
111
 Corporations are likely to change 
compensation packages to conform to the guidelines produced by the 
institutional advisory groups.
112
 Unfortunately, this could allow for 
 
 
supra note 82 (―An unrelenting focus on pay for performance may ironically undercut the ability of 
top executives to lead their companies.‖). Id. (―If you want laser-like focus on management pay 
incentives, you may take the managers‘ attention away from important long-term objectives.‖). 
 105. See supra note 82 and accompanying comments. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as Required 
Under Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 64 (stating that the SEC‘s finalized regulations for implementing 
the Dodd-Frank say on pay provisions will require all publicly traded companies to give shareholders a 
nonbinding say on pay vote and a nonbinding vote on the frequency of the say on pay vote). 
 108. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 
supra note 64 (stating that the proposed SEC regulations for administering the Dodd-Frank Act say on 
pay requirements apply to all companies already required to disclose, regardless of size). 
 109. See Editorial, supra note 83 (commenting that the SEC has not always vigorously enforced 
regulations within its ability on the issue of executive compensation regulation, with the lack of 
Sarbanes-Oxley enforcement as an example). 
 110. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 343–44. 
 111. The benefits of institutional advisory groups have been described as follows: ―These firms 
analyze and make recommendations on corporate issues for institutional investors that are too busy to 
do this research themselves. They are not like the credit ratings agencies, which can disrupt markets.‖ 
Steven M. Davidoff, Deal Professor: In One Area, Companies Want More, Not Less, Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at B7. 
 112. Some commentators believe that institutional investor advisory groups will yield 
considerable power because a large number of institutional investors in the U.S. will take their voting 
cues from the recommendations provided by the institutional advisory groups. See, e.g., Ronald D. 
Orol, Dodd-Frank‟s „Say on Pay‟ Could Impact Executive Pay: SEC to Write Rules Giving 
Institutional Investors a Non-Binding Say on CEO Pay, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 26, 2010, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/new-say-on-pay-law-could-temper-ceo-pay-2010-08-26? 
pagenumber=1 (―RiskMetrics and a couple other proxy advisory firms are expected to make 
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excessive levels of compensation if the company is conforming to 
institutional guidelines.
113
 That result would fly in the face of the goal of 
the Dodd-Frank Act: to increase corporate governance and curb excessive 
corporate pay for poor company management.
114
 
Another likely adverse consequence of increased institutional advisory 
group influence is the possibility that shareholders, by following the 
voting advice of the institutional advisory group,
115
 will reject an 
otherwise acceptable executive compensation plan.
116
 While the 
institutional advisory groups assist institutional investors, the groups‘ 
standardized approach to compensation could result in an executive 
compensation package that is inappropriate for the executives at the 
company.
117
 In a worst case scenario, shareholders voting ―no‖ could 
cause a company to change its compensation package for executives to 
such a degree that it adversely impacts the success of the company.
118
 
Moreover, whereas the United Kingdom requires shareholders to vote 
on executive compensation plans annually,
119
 the opportunity for 
shareholders of a corporation in the United States to vote on executive 
compensation only once every three years
120
 allows for much less scrutiny 
than had the vote been required annually.
121
 Thus, inappropriate 
 
 
recommendations to a large chunk of the U.S. institutional investor community about whether to 
accept a particular pay package.‖). 
 113. The concern is that institutional investor advisory groups will attempt to apply similar 
compensation standards to all companies, but each company has different needs that may benefit from 
different executive compensation.. Id. (―[P]ay packages in the U.S. will become homogenized and 
heavily influenced by standards set by institutional investor groups and proxy advisory companies 
. . . .‖). 
 114. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010). 
 115. But cf. Cohan, supra note 83 (arguing that because the say on pay vote is nonbinding, the 
board of directors and management of the company need not take any action, because no adverse 
consequences result from a nonbinding vote). 
 116. See Orol, supra note 112 (noting that many institutional investors, in their role as 
shareholders, will likely follow the voting advice provided by institutional advisory groups). 
 117. Id. (noting that executives should be concerned that institutional advisory groups‘ influence 
on voting could create ―a one-size-fits-all approach to pay‖ that would not be the most effective means 
of correctly compensating executives at a particular company). 
 118. This issue is not simply that the compensation is inappropriate for the executives from a 
competitive standpoint, meaning an executive needs to be paid a competitive wage in order for the 
company to retain his or her services. Rather, the problem is that the performance measures of the 
performance-contingent compensation, which could represent a significant portion of executive 
compensation, could change from being the correct goals that would ensure company success if 
achieved to incorrect goals that could result in company failure.  
 119. See Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, supra note 19, § 7. 
 120. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2010). 
 121. Based on preliminary data, it appears a sizable portion of companies will choose to have their 
say on pay vote occur only once every three years. See TOWERS WATSON, supra note 94 (noting that 
in a recent survey conducted in mid-December of 2010 of 135 companies, 39% indicated that they 
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compensation plans for executives could be in place for three years before 
the shareholders are afforded an opportunity to vote under the Dodd-Frank 
Act.
122
  
B. Benefits 
Despite the potential negative effects of the say on pay provision in 
Dodd-Frank, it creates a number of potential benefits as well. The same 
benefits observed by the United Kingdom should apply equally to the 
United States.
123
 Certainly, the hope is that the say on pay measure 
implemented by the Dodd-Frank Act will help curb the scandals that occur 
regarding excessive executive compensation following periods of poor 
performance.
124
 Additionally, the attractiveness of the capital markets in 
the United States may increase to investors knowing that they will have 
more influence over executive compensation than they have had 
traditionally.
125
 Moreover, because of shareholders‘ newfound power, 
substantive dialogue between shareholders and management of the 
company should increase as well.
126
 
Based on the voluntary adoption of say on pay provisions by 
companies in the United States before the passage of the Dodd-Frank 
Act
127
 and the rejection by shareholders of executive compensation plans 
at three companies that voluntarily adopted say on pay provisions before 
the Dodd-Frank Act,
128
 there is reason to believe that the say on pay 
provisions under the Dodd-Frank Act will be used more vigorously than 
the say on pay provisions under the DRR Regulations.
129
 Moreover, as of 
June 30, 2011, early results of the say on pay votes for 2011 have 
indicated shareholders‘ willingness to vote down executive compensation 
 
 
expected to have a say on pay vote occur once every three years). 
 122. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2010).. 
 123. See Davis, supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  
 127. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 51 (noting Verizon shareholders approved a voluntarily 
adopted nonbinding say on pay provision); see also Bachelder, supra note 51 (noting that roughly 80 
companies had adopted some form of say on pay provision as of June 4, 2010). 
 128. Three companies, KeyCorp, Motorola Inc., and Occidental Petroleum Corporation had 
executive compensation pay packages rejected during the 2010 proxy season. See Jaffari, supra note 
57. 
 129. See Davis, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that in the first four years following the enactment of 
say on pay legislation in the United Kingdom, only eight companies, all of which were small in size, 
with the exception of GlaxoSmithKline, had say on pay resolutions defeated). But see PIRC, supra 
note 33 (noting that three companies received a rejection of their DRRs by shareholders in 2010).  
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plans; 37 of the over 2200 companies reporting voting results in the 
Russell 3000 had a majority of shareholders give a negative vote to the 
companies‘ executive compensation plans.130 If the goal of the Dodd-
Frank Act‘s say on pay provision was to give greater power to 
shareholders to voice their opinions on executive compensation plans, the 
initial results are encouraging that shareholders will be willing and able to 
do so. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Dodd-Frank Act is a strong step in the right direction towards the 
goal of increasing corporate governance through executive compensation 
regulation. As the United Kingdom has demonstrated, though votes by 
shareholders are nonbinding, companies are cognizant of the voting and 
adjust their compensation accordingly.
131
 Moreover, the United Kingdom 
has shown that even the possibility of a ―no‖ vote will steer companies 
towards more appropriate levels of executive compensation.
132
 
However, the Dodd-Frank Act would have had more teeth if the vote 
had been required on an annual basis, similar to the United Kingdom‘s 
requirements.
133
 Instead, the vote is potentially held only once every three 
years, with the ability to change the timing occurring only once every six 
years.
134
 Additionally, although the final SEC regulations to enforce the 
Dodd-Frank Act‘s say on pay provision apply to all publicly traded 
companies,
135
 it is possible the SEC‘s actual enforcement for all 
companies could be lacking.
136
 Moreover, had the Dodd-Frank Act been 
more nuanced in its requirements and given shareholders the ability to 
provide more direction than simply ―yes‖ or ―no,‖ shareholders would 
have had the opportunity to proactively shape the type of compensation to 
be given in the future rather than retroactively pass judgment on what has 
already been paid.  
 
 
 130. Ted Allen et al., supra note 97, at 2. Eight S&P 500 companies and twenty-nine Russell 3000 
firms received negative votes for their executive compensation plans. Id. at 3. Out of the thirty-seven 
companies receiving less than 50% approval of their executive compensation plan, eleven received 
less than 40% approval. Id. Additionally, forty-one companies only received between 50% and 60% 
approval for their executive compensation plan. Id. 
 131. See supra Part II.C. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Directors‘ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, supra note 19, § 7. 
 134. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010). 
 135. See SEC Press Release, supra note 64. 
 136. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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In light of the results of say on pay in the United Kingdom, the Dodd-
Frank Act‘s say on pay provision represents a significant change to 
corporate governance in the United States. While the long-term results 
may not prove to be as effective as originally hoped because of the 
nonbinding nature of the vote and its potential infrequency, the Dodd-
Frank Act‘s say on pay provision is a major step forward in increasing 
corporate governance of executive compensation. 
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